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3Divine Foreknowledge and the 
Arrow of Time
On the Impossibility of Retrocausation
ALAN G. PADGETT
Recent discussion of divine foreknowledge has raised again the old issue of whether 
or not it is possible to bring about the past, that is, to cause the past to be what it was.1 
In this essay I argue that such backward causation against time, or retrocausation, is 
impossible and thus cannot help us out of the problem of divine foreknowledge and 
human freedom. However, this should close the door to only one of many ways of 
solving this dilemma.2
To begin, what does it mean to say that some event is impossible or necessary? A 
good heuristic device, stemming from Leibniz’s philosophy, is to speak of “possible 
worlds. Clearly, the world might have been different, even considering the whole 
history of the world past, present, and future. The story of the world, all of it, might be 
different. Let us understand a “possible world-story” to be a coherent and compossi- 
ble set of descriptions of what the world might have been like.3 Every event or object 
we stipulate as being in that particular story brings with it any essential and necessary 
properties into the world-story in question. Further, to qualify as a world-story, for 
every object or event mentioned in the story, a full description occurs in that world- 
story. Finally, all necessary truths we assume to be affirmed in every world-story, 
though we lack time and knowledge to stipulate every part of the story.4
How best to say that something “happens” or “exists” in a world-story is a delicate 
matter. To say that some event “happens” in a world-story, as in any story, is to say that 
the description of that event is affirmed in that world-story. An object is real in a story 
when its existence or reality is affirmed in that story. A necessary event, then, is one 
whose description is affirmed in all possible world-stories which we could (given 
prior stipulations and constraints) coherently tell. An impossible event is one whose
65
bb God and Time
description is never coherently affirmed in any story. I will argue that retrocausation is 
never properly affirmed in any world-story because it is incoherent or incompatible 
W1 Pr‘or Parts of the story of each possible world.
What, then, is backward causation? By retrocausation I understand a complex 
event in which one event causes another event which is prior to it in time. Thus a pres­
ent event might cause a past event to be what it was, or a future event might cause a 
present event to be what it is. Retrocausation involves making the past what it was, not 
changing” the past (changing the past is incoherent).51 exclude, from the beginning, 
all non-causal relationships between things from consideration as examples of retro­
causation. For example, I would allow for the retrosatisfaction of truth conditions for 
future-tensed propositions. In other words, I allow that what happens in the future is 
what makes future-tensed propositions true or false. This is because the satisfaction of 
truth conditions is a logical, not a causal, relationship; it is not an example of retrocau-
Sdtion. e can agree to treat future-tensed propositions as true or false in the abstract 
anguage-game of logic, even if no one can know their truth-value until what they de- 
scri e takes place (or not). Backward causation against the arrow of time I understand 
o e a causal force that occurs between real objects and events, not a relationship be­
tween ideas or propositions.
What is it, then, for one thing to cause another? Theories of causation abound in the 
i erature. shall adopt one for the purpose of this essay; however, I claim that any ad­
equate t eory of causation will come, mutatis mutandis, to the same conclusions I 
reach here.
In brief outline, let us agree for the purpose of this argument that one event or thing 
states are,Ot a^<llnSt a backgr°tind of certain relevant states of affairs. Among these
1. the initial conditions at a time
2. the causal powers of the objects involved
7 the relevant relationships between the objects involved
4. the nature of the objects involved
iectshuhk COat‘nuant or “substance”: God, people, and trees are examples of ob- 
these nhieot T • JeCtS 'n concrete relationship create events in spacetime.7 Given 
brinus 'lbnin' at,onsb‘Ps’ and states, event A causes event B if the occurrence of A 
affairs 8 Because' T l° CaSC the occurrence ofB in the context of that state of 
interested het n t CaUSati°n iS baSed upon the nature of the objects Evolved, I am 
powers oJeris^r^ects" ““* ** ** ““
of nature sre'merel°S°^?rS ‘,f c;"’:,stior, >n terms of laws of nature. But the laws
Thus, the account I give of cam-at on natUre CaUSal P°WerS °f ob-lects-
is a law of nature that nothin^ t UdeS so'called laws of nature. For example, it 
clearly, this law „ „„r " *"«*-«' ‘W «• 1«<l * light. But
jects and their causal powers The “law f °f the "atUre °f physical ob-
of the nature and causal powers of phyXlo^tsF * partici”arkind of d—iption
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find tb nement’s st’b needed for this summary outline of causation. Sometimes 
. bp r '1Klny CVCllls work together to cause some effect. In this case, A will have
, i n'1SI e,rC<’ a coraP'ex event, a mereological sum of events. Retrocausation
wou d then take place when A, or some part of A, is temporally after its effect, B. To 
take an example from Dummett, if I pray that my son would be among the survivors of 
a shipwreck in the past, but which I have just heard about, if my prayer is efficacious, 
then it will be part of the cause of my son being among the survivors. This would be an 
examp e of retrocausation, even though my prayer is only a part of a large complex 
eVe^ w causes W son to have been among the survivors.1 his sketch of the idea of causation leaves open the issue of time in the concept of 
retrocausation. The philosophy of time is, if anything, even more complicated than 
causation. With respect to the reality of the temporal process from past to future (or 
just “process” for short) philosophers basically fall into two camps. There are those 
who follow the process theory (or A-theory, or tensed theory) and those who reject 
that view in favor of what I call the stasis theory (or B-theory, or tenseless theory).
According to process theories (which come in several types), temporal passage is an 
objective part of the world. Stasis theorists deny this proposition, holding that past, 
present, and future are subjective or mind-dependent properties of events. Remember, 
the time we are talking about here involves the passage from past to present to fu­
ture, not the anisotropy of time nor the measure of time.Possible world-stories fall into three large classes with respect to the reality of 
process in that world-story. First, there are those which are altogether timeless, where 
time itself does not come into the story. Second, there are those temporal world-stones 
in which the process theory of time is true. Third, there are stasis worlds in which past, 
present, and future are subjective and are not affirmed as part of the “real” or external 
world. These are all the possibilities there are regarding worlds and time. I shall argue 
that retrocausation, it turns out, is impossible in all three of these world-stories, and
therefore is impossible in all world-stories we could coherently tell.
First of all, do these three options exhaust all possibilities? Yes, they do. For time
must be part of a world or not. If it does not occur, then we have the first class of wor - 
stories. If it does occur, then either process is part of that world-story or it is not. If it is, 
then we have the second class of world-stories. If it is not, then we have the third class.
So all possible world-stories are included in these three classes.
We begin by considering the case of the first class of worlds. In such stories, events
(if there are any) are completely timeless. The concept of retrocausation, however, en 
tails a temporal separation between events. So retrocausation is impossible in t e irst
class of worlds, by definition. .Our next consideration is the class of world-stories in which the passage o time is
of ontological importance for the objective world, that is, world-stories that a rm e 
process theory of time. Our discussion of this class will turn on a rationa intui ion o 
noetic insight I offer for your consideration: the causal impassibility and impotence o 
the unreal. If something lacks reality, how can it be changed in any way, in a caus 
sense? If something lacks reality, how can it affect real things ? On t e process c 
of time, the past is unreal. For this reason, it can no longer be affected by nor affect he 
present. I cannot now make the past be what it was, because those events are go
i
i
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f Hire is not real and can have 
cannot be changed: they no longer exist. Likewise, the iu .mvthing to happen.12
no effect on the present. For only what is real can direct y ‘ causal chain> that
Now the past, of course, does affect the present, but only t b
is, only through indirect causes. ded b the smaiiest
Imagine the history of every object in the 'vorld;s‘°1^ (however short) in 
episode in each object’s life. The smallest episodes will be pfes_
which no change takes place in that object. According to t P wjn
ent episodes of objects are fully real. The present episode of< Y J
stand to be in a process of becoming. The former episode is ta b , •
and thus into non-reality. The future episode of the object is coming in fujj’y reaj 
ing from non-reality to reality. Only the present episodes of al o jec s ‘ ‘ ’
The present instant (NOW) will thus be an abstract, conceptua , uM 10 
which picks out all those real episodes for every existing thing in t e univ 1
are simultaneous with all other real episodes. Only present episodes are u y i ‘ . an 
only what is real or actual can directly bring something about (i.e., apart rom a causa 
chain of events). .
The standard objection at this point is that the process theory would not allow us to 
bring anything about. For if I cannot affect nor effect the future, then t e u ure wi 
never get here. For the very next moment is, after all, future relative to the present. I 
cannot bring about the future, then all causation must be simultaneous if it is to lappen 
at all (the objection goes). But that conclusion lands us in an infinite regress o simul­
taneous causes rather than a temporal progression of causes.
The answer to this problem from a process perspective is to think of the present in 
two ways: the present episode of all real objects, and the NOW understood as an ab­
stract and conceptual point. The NOW points to all real episodes, without reducing all 
real episodes to a durationless instant. Think of this abstraction as a kind of red laser 
pointer, which highlights the present episode in all real things, without reducing those 
episodes to its own abstract, durationless instant. So the present episode of some real 
object is in the process of becoming. It is not a mere instant of time. As the history of an 
object advances, it passes from one episode to the next one: what is now present be­
comes past (unreal), and what was only potential (future) becomes actual (present). 
Such an understanding of becoming does allow for temporal passage. But what counts 
as future (and therefore as merely potential rather than fully real) changes with the 
passage of time. Thus the future never becomes real as future, but only in the process 
of becoming. In the process of becoming, what was (merely) future becomes actual 
(present).13 So the process theory of time is coherent with our intuition about the 
causal impassibility and impotence of the unreal.
Given the intuition that what is not real cannot directly causally affect us, nor can it 
be affected, it turns out that any possible world-story which affirms the process theory 
of time cannot consistently affirm any description of retrocausation. For any such de­
scription would imply a contradiction when joined with our insight about the causal 
impotence and impassibility of the unreal. Any stories which we would like to tell 
about retrocausation will not be affirmed in any possible world-story with prior com­
mitments to both our basic intuition and the process theory of time.1,1
Perhaps the proponent of retrocausation will want to reply that our intuition about 
the causal impotence and impassibility of the unreal may be true but is not logically
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on the followingnecessary. However, before taking this move she ought to r jeast -n
point. Part of what we mean when we say something is Tea is t a when we af- 
principle, causally interrelate with other things. So part of what we ^passible. Our 
firm that something is unreal simply is that it is causally impotent a therefore
intuition, then, upon a little reflection, turns out to be an analytic
affirmed in all possible world-stories. the stasis theory of
This leaves us with the third class of worlds, those that a arm sense of the 
time. In this class of world-stories, duration does occur ( time illusion, or
word), but temporal process is either denied altogether, or re c8‘^ passage from 
understood in some way to be merely subjective. On such t eone , eyent Any 
future to present docs not change the reality or unreality o any nQ(. be affirmed 
experience of the A-series (as McTaggart called process) simp y d the primary 
in such stories; or it will be seen as a kind of secondary qua 1 y, ‘ stasis the-
qualities of before, after, and simultaneity. What is objective y
ory, is the B-series of ordered events in a before-after series. tjon ;s not univer-
Even within the third class of world-stories, however, retroausation is impos- 
sally affirmed. There are some subclasses of worlds in w ic 1 r certain solu-
sible. One well-known world is the so-called Godel un^er^rtt Q^del.16 In the Godel 
tions to the equations of general relativity discovered y “ iv6fse possesses a spa- 
world-story, the matter in the universe is in rotation, an wse aqows for closed
tial homogeneity—but not isotropy. This model o «t-metravel.”l7'Whilethema-
time-like curves for world-lines of objects, and thus or 1 «ome world-lines are
jority of the matter in this universe travels “forward m time,.
possible which are closed, time-like loops. Indeed, for any two points P and Q on the 
world-lines of massive material objects, where P is before Q on that line, it is possible 
in the Godel universe to travel in such a way as to move “forward” in (local) time, and 
still travel from Q “back” to P.
The problem with worlds like this, where one can travel backward and forward in 
“time, is that the distinction between before and after seems rather arbitrary. True, for 
any given mass it will be possible to designate a local, proper time for that object and 
its world-line. But the universe as a whole does not seem to have any objective, uni­
versal way of deciding which direction is “past” and which is “future.” The mathe­
matics will work in either direction! Granted that the Godel universe is temporally ori­
entable, in closed time loops any instance of forward causation is also just as truly 
called a case of backward causation. P comes “before” Q in one perspective, and just 
as validly P comes “after” Q in another perspective.
Perhaps, one might respond, this is just the way things are. Temporal order is a mat­
ter of perspective and convention. If this is so, then of course what looks like retrocau­
sation is possible. For the “retro” part of backward causation will not be true univer­
sally, and also not true for God (I assume for this paper that God is also temporal in 
some sense). What is measured as retrocausation in one frame of reference will be 
normal, forward causation in another frame of reference. But of course in this case 
what we do not have is genuine retrocausation, that is, backward causation against an 
objective arrow of time.
Reflection on the Godel universe leads us to some conceptual necessities for 
any world-stories which affirm retrocausation. Two things must be affirmed in any
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world-story in order to make a claim of retrocausation significant: (a) time must be 
anisotropic, and (b) the purported case of retrocausation must be in a topologically 
open world-line, one which not only in fact but even in principle cannot be closed, 
or strictly speaking any “forward” causal connection in a closed time-line could be 
just as well called a case of retrocausation. The idea of backward causation includes 
the notion that one is going backward against something, after all, and not just arbi- 
rarily choosing a temporal starting point and direction (or “arrow”). Thus not every 
'yor story in the third class (i.e., stasis worlds) can coherently affirm a genuine and 
significant case of causation.
• Ac“rdlng t0 some Philosophers, time and causation are merely human points of 
view, any of these philosophers have been idealists, but not all. Godel himself may 
e me u ed among them.18 In some world-stories, therefore, “backward” and “for- 
war are just a matter of perspective, and thus there is no ontologically real arrow of 
ime. n such worlds, genuine retrocausation does not occur because the ordering of 
events as before and after is merely conventional. In order for the “backward” part of
e concept to be meaningful for the problem of omniscience (i.e., for God), the arrow 
o ime needs to be ontologically real. This provides us with a third criterion, viz. (c) 
empora or er and causal asymmetry must be ontologically genuine. Let us call the 
or stories which affirm all three of these criteria STAT worlds (stasis theory with
an objective arrow of time).
c„. ll,ere t0 be any theologically meaningful use for the idea of “backward
evpni A°n’- t 6Se l^ree cr'ter'a must be affirmed. It is indeed logically possible that 
z■ mig 1 cause event B, and B would seem to be earlier in time to some human
not hp° onin’sc’ent> omnipresent God). The problem is that such an event would 
„ r^n?° °gIcdby genuine retrocausation, only apparent retrocausation. In such
not future to God know wbat looked like “future” to us but was not really future,
firmprt °Ur adent’on n°w to that set of worlds where the stasis theory of time is af- 
STAT wnri our three criteria for theologically meaningful retrocausation (i.e.,
of the world S °neS '. tbe A-series of past, present, and future is notan objective part 
events in -m’ a^?or.ing t0 STAT world-stories, what accounts for the ordering of 
anisotronv of t? ^SCtlv^ ^-series at all? That is, what accounts for the temporal 
the coherence of & 71 WOr,ds? This is a keY question for those who would assert 
wouiXTe di pp, CarSatl°n- AS Me'l0r WOte’ “If omy A series existed, that
later must be sough! elsewhere ’^A § differenCe between earlier and
events is their causal order- “Th AtLOTdlng t0 Mellor, what gives temporal order to 
One event occurs before th directl0n of time 1S the direction of causation.”21
ond or the second event i - ° ^i t™6’ because the flrst event is a cause of the sec- 
firms, then fi,at A h f ^imultaneous some effect of the first. When one af- 
planation for temporal anlsotr" tH°Se worId"stories which affirm a causal ex-
simultaneous Some eZt S’°nC “ ** A " Ca“SaI* Prior to B or A * 
one means by temporal precedence Xl° B’However’ when that is wllat 
retrocausation is analytically false th-Ns" h affirmation of a description of
of time simply means Jhe direefion of 7 , ’"7 ? ° COntradk'tio11- Wkcn the arrow 
of time is conceptually incoherent ‘ 10n’ ackward causation against the arrow
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A more traditional stasis theory about what temporal order consists in, for STA 
world-stories, is the view of GriinbaumAccording to this theory, the d^er^ce 
tween earlier and later in time has to do with the increase of entropy. Roughly, the am 
ity of a system to do “work” is a measure of entropy.23 Increase in entropy entails, t 
dissipation of energy from part of the system to the whole and a decrease in the wno 
system’s ability to do work, that is, a decrease in available energy. An increase m 
tropy involves necessarily a dissipation of energy from some part of the system 
system as a whole.
If we affirm a physical theory of the order of time in a STAT world-story, then event 
A is before event B if and only if entropy (or some other physical process) . 
creased between A and B. This implies that event A is part of an episode ot a y. 
with lower entropy than another episode of that system which includes wen 
now we have to ask, how is it possible on this theory for B to cause A. ° c 
some object (or objects) of which B is an expression will have to bring a ou 
these objects will have to expend energy, that is, do some “work.” Remem ^ase 
considering cases of natural causation, brought about by real objects. B can y 
A when the objects-in-relation we call B bring about A. But that means { lies>
jects will have to increase entropy in order to change from B to A. tts in u 
however, that B must (on this theory) be temporally prior to A. An is 
our original supposition, viz. that A was before B in time. So any wor ‘ between
the future might exert to cause the past to be what it was will increase en r P con_ 
the future and the past. But this is contrary to the theory of tempora or e . aum, 
sideration. This means that on the theory of temporal order advoca e
once again, retrocausation is impossible. . physical
The two cases we have analyzed are similar at several poin . ’ retrocau.
theory of temporal order for STAT worlds will have this same pro em
sation. But on a stasis theory of time, if some Pjysic^’“T^/JXrse? That does 
count for temporal order, what does? Is it just a brute fact ihi]itv of retrocau-
seem a little hard to swallow. At this point the defender o t e p order at aU?
sation may object. Why does she have to develop some t eory . Pfor something to
That is, why does the defender have to affirm some view ‘ defender
M later than another in lime? T!t= answer to £ is mtiau.by tern-
of retrocausation should tell us what is meant by ret , ^ns obvious, and those
poral precedence. The possibility of retroca"s“ of lhe possibility of retro-
who assert its possibility need to argue for it. The de . possible. The sec-
causation owes ns an analysis of what exactly she „ very large
ond reason is inductive. I have supplied an analys . be and found
number of possible world-stories, being as 'XSb^iX* with other 
retrocausation to be incoherent in each world-s ory ( jon is incompatible (“ex­
truths affirmed in each story). So I conclude a r rocnusation can give me some 
ternally incoherent”) unless and until defenders of retrocausation g
reason to believe otherwise. internretations of modern physics imply or in-
I am aware that certain models or interpretedo , . g i§ correct) 8UCh models
elude the idea of retrocausation. But 1 mymonc ‘ • ;‘cally faise, ()[. else not exam-
and solutions will (logically must turn out to be P y these models Wlll
pies of retrocausation. More precisely, the world-lines allow
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merely measured as b°f events connected e-S->a tacil>°n be£,m W,1J be 
ric, and not onto! • a 8 P£lSt” W'tbin some inertia] system and its associated met- 
gued, there are nt?1 2 3 4 S'Ca y or Senuinely past. In any case, as William Lane Craig has ar- 
ward causation doesToToccur 24*Ch modernphysics can be interpreted,in which back" 
The ideaofretr & ^bUUal rattler (,1;m a refutation of the possibility of retrocausation. 
with other truths Th8^10”’WilGn *S SpePed out’is cit,ler incoherent or incompatible 
ble, but merely -i aVC admitted tbat apparent backward causation is logically possi- 
because God wil/^V1* fetrocausat'on does not help divine foreknowledge. This is
tion to know the future O i ftlture t0 God’in order to use backward causa-
is present or past to r t?erwi?e’ God simply uses ordinary causation to know what 
on earth). What is f T J V'nC mind ievcn if that event appears to be future to humans 
just apparently future tnr?,tOranOm^SCient and omniPresent God is really future, not 
°ry of temporal ord ’ ° conc us*on> tber>. unless a coherent and compatible the­
ologians should avokV^mJ60 by d®fenders of retrocausation, philosophers and the- 
freedom which imply retro .'°nS *° probIem of divine foreknowledge and human
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